March 1, 2013 |
The statement below was read by Pfc. Bradley Manning at a
providence inquiry for his formal plea of guilty to one specification as
charged and nine specifications for lesser included offenses. He pled
not guilty to 12 other specifications. This rush transcript was taken
by journalist Alexa O’Brien at Thursday’s pretrial hearing and first appeared on Salon.com.
Judge Lind: Pfc. Manning you may read your statement.
Pfc. Bradley Manning: Yes,
your Honor. I wrote this statement in the confinement facility. The
following facts are provided in support of the providence inquiry for my
court martial, United States v. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning.
Personal Facts.
I
am a 25-year-old Private First Class in the United States Army
currently assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, HHC, U.S.
Army Garrison (USAG), Joint Base Myer, Henderson Hall, Fort Meyer, Va.
My
[missed word] assignment I was assigned to HHC, 2nd Brigade Combat
Team, 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, N.Y. My primary military
occupational specialty or MOS is 35 Foxtrot intelligence analyst. I
entered active duty status on 2 October 2007. I enlisted with the hope
of obtaining both real-world experience and earning benefits under the
GI Bill for college opportunities.
Facts regarding my position as an intelligence analyst.
In
order to enlist in the Army I took the Standard Armed Services Aptitude
Battery or [ASVAB?]. My score on this battery was high enough for me to
qualify for any enlisted MOS positon. My recruiter informed me that I
should select an MOS that complimented my interests outside the
military. In response, I told him that I was interested in geopolitical
matters and information technology. He suggested that I consider
becoming an intelligence analyst.
After researching the
intelligence analyst position, I agreed that this would be a good fit
for me. In particular, I enjoyed the fact that an analyst could use
information derived from a variety of sources to create work products
that informed the command of its available choices for determining the
best course of action, or COAs. Although the MOS required working
knowledge of computers, it primarily required me to consider how raw
information can be combined with other available intelligence sources in
order to create products that assisted the command in its situational
awareness, or SA.
I accessed that my natural interest in
geopolitical affairs and my computer skills would make me an excellent
intelligence analyst. After enlisting I reported to the Fort Meade
military entrance processing station on 1 October 2007. I then traveled
to and reported at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., on 2 October 2007 to begin
basic combat training, or BCT.
Once at Fort Leonard Wood I quickly
realized that I was neither physically nor mentally prepared for the
requirements of basic training. My BCT experience lasted six months
instead of the normal 10 weeks. Due to medical issues, I was placed on a
hold status. A physical examination indicated that I sustained injuries
to my right soldier and left foot.
Due to those injuries, I was
unable to continue “basic.” During medical hold, I was informed that I
may be out-processed from the Army; however, I resisted being chaptered
out because I felt that I could overcome my medical issues and continue
to serve. On 2[8 or 20?] January 2008, I returned to basic combat
training. This time I was better prepared and I completed training on 2
April 2008.
I then reported for the MOS specific Advanced
Individual Training, or AIT, on 7 April 2008. AIT was an enjoyable
experience for me. Unlike basic training, where I felt different from
the other soldiers, I fit in did well. I preferred the mental challenges
of reviewing a large amount of information from various sources and
trying to create useful or actionable products. I especially enjoyed the
practice of analysis through the use of computer applications and
methods that I was familiar with.
I graduated from AIT on 16
August 2008 and reported to my first duty station, Fort Drum, N.Y., on
28 August 2008. As an analyst, Significant Activities, or SigActs, were a
frequent source of information for me to use in creating work products.
I started working extensively with SigActs early after my arrival at
Fort Drum. My computer background allowed me to use the tools organic to
the Distributed Common Ground System-Army, or D6-A, computers to create
polished work products for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team chain of
command.
The non-commissioned officer in charge, or NCOIC, of the
S2 section, then Master Sergeant David P. Adkins recognized my skills
and potential and tasked me to work on a tool abandoned by a previously
assigned analyst, the incident tracker. The incident tracker was viewed
as a back up to the Combined Information Data Network Exchange, or
CIDNE, and as a unit, historical reference to work with.
In the
months preceding my upcoming deployment, I worked on creating a new
version of the incident tracker and used SigActs to populate it. The
SigActs I used were from Afghanistan because, at the time, our unit was
scheduled to deploy to the Logar and Wardak Provinces of Afghanistan.
Later, my unit was reassigned to deploy to Eastern Baghdad, Iraq. At
that point, I removed the Afghanistan SigActs and switched to Iraq
SigActs.
As an analyst, I viewed the SigActs as historical data. I
believe this view is shared by other all-source analysts, as well.
SigActs gives a first-look impression of a specific or isolated event.
This event can be an improvised explosive device attack, or IED, small
arms fire engagement, or SAF engagement, with a hostile force, or any
other event a specific unit documented and recorded in real time.
In
my perspective, the information contained within a single SigAct or
group of SigActs is not very sensitive. The events encapsulated within
most SigActs involve either enemy engagements or causalities. Most of
this information is publicly reported by the public affairs office, or
PAO, embedded media pools, or host nation (HN) media.
As I started
working with SigActs I felt they were similar to a daily journal or log
that a person may keep. They capture what happens on a particular day
in time. They are created immediately after the event, and are
potentially updated over a period of hours until final version is
published on the Combined Information Data Network Exchange. Each unit
has its own Standard Operating Procedure, or SOP, for reporting
recording SigActs. The SOP may differ between reporting in a particular
deployment and reporting in garrison.
In garrison, a SigAct
normally involves personnel issues such as driving under the influence,
or DUI, incidents or an automobile accident involving the death or
serious injury of a soldier. The reports starts at the company level and
goes up to the battalion, brigade and even up to the division level.
In
deployed environment, a unit may observe or participate in an event and
a platoon leader or platoon sergeant may report the event as a SigAct
to the company headquarters and the radio transmission operator, or RTO.
The commander or RTO will then forward the report to the battalion
battle captain or battle non-commissioned officer, or NCO. Once the
battalion battle captain or battle NCO receives the report they will
either (1) notify the battalion operations officer or S3; (2) conduct an
action, such as launching a quick reaction force; or (3) record the
event and report and further report it up the chain of command to the
brigade.
The reporting of each event is done by radio or over the
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network or SIPRNet, normally by an
assigned soldier, usually junior enlisted E-4 and below. Once the SigAct
is recorded, the SigAct is further sent up the chain of command. At
each level, additional information can either be added or corrected as
needed. Normally within 24 to 48 hours, the updating and reporting or a
particular SigAct is complete. Eventually all reports and SigActs go
through the chain of command from brigade to division and division to
corp. At corp level the SigAct is finalized and [missed word].
The
CIDNE system contains a database that is used by thousands of
Department of Defense (DoD) personel, including soldiers, civilians and
contractors support. It was the United States Central Command, or
CENTCOM, reporting tool for operational reporting in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Two separate but similar databases were maintained for each
theater — CIDNE-I for Iraq and CIDNE-A for Afghanistan. Each database
encompasses over a hundred types of reports and other historical
information for access. They contain millions of vetted and finalized
directories including operational intelligence reporting.
CIDNE
was created to collect and analyze battle-space data to provide daily
operational and Intelligence Community (IC) reporting relevant to a
commander’s daily decision making process. The CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A
databases contain reporting and analysis fields for multiple disciplines
including Human Intelligence, or HUMINT, reports; Psychological
Operations, or PSYOP, reports; Engagement reports; Counter Improvised
Explosive Device, or CIED, reports; SigAct reports; Targeting reports;
Social and Cultural reports; Civil Affairs reports; and Human Terrain
reporting.
As an intelligence analyst, I had unlimited access to
the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A databases and the information contained within
them. Although each table within the database is important, I primarily
dealt with HUMINT reports, SigAct reports and Counter IED reports,
because these reports were used to create a work-product I was required
to published as an analyst.
In working on an assignment I looked
anywhere and everywhere for information. As an all-source analyst, this
was something that was expected. The D6-A systems had databases built
in, and I utilized them on a daily basis. This simply was — the search
tools available on the D6-A systems on SIPRNet such as Query Tree and
the DoD and Intellink search engines.
Primarily, I utilized the
CIDNE database using the historical and HUMINT reporting to conduct my
analysis and provide a back up for my work product. I did statistical
analysis on historical data including SigActs to back up analysis that
were based on HUMINT reporting and produce charts, graphs and tables. I
also created maps and charts to conduct predictive analysis based on
statistical trends. The SigAct reporting provided a reference point for
what occurred and provided myself and other analysts with the
information to conclude possible outcome.
Although SigAct
reporting is sensitive at the time of their creation, their sensitivity
normally dissipates within 48 to 72 hours as the information is either
publicly released or the unit involved is no longer in the area and not
in danger.
It is my understanding that the SigAct reports remain
classified only because they are maintained within CIDNE — because it is
only accessible on SIPRnet. Everything on CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A to
include SigAct reporting was treated as classified information.
Facts regarding the storage of SigAct Reports.
As
part of my training at Fort Drum, I was instructed to ensure that I
create back ups of my work product. The need to create back ups was
particularly acute given the relative instability and reliability of the
computer systems we used in the field during deployment. These computer
systems included both organic and theater provided equipment (TPE) D6-A
machines.
The organic D6-A machines we brought with us into the
field on our deployment were Dell [missed word] laptops and the TPE D6-A
machines were Alienware brand laptops. The [M90?] D6-A laptops were the
preferred machine to use as they were slightly faster and had fewer
problems with dust and temperature than the theater provided Alienware
laptops. I used several D6-A machines during the deployment due to
various technical problems with the laptops.
With these issues
several analysts lost information, but I never lost information due to
the multiple backups I created. I attempted to backup as much relevant
information as possible. I would save the information so that I or
another analyst could quickly access it whenever a machine crashed,
SIPRnet connectivity was down or I forgot where the data was stored.
When backing up information I would do one or all of the following things based on my training:
[(1)]
Physical back up. I tried to keep physical back up copies of
information on paper so that the information could be grabbed quickly.
Also, it was easier to brief from hard copies of research and HUMINT
reports.
(2) Local drive back up. I tried to sort out information I
deemed relevant and keep complete copies of the information on each of
the computers I used in the Temporary Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility, or T-SCIF, including my primary and secondary D6-A
machines. This was stored under my user profile on the desktop.
[(3)]
Shared drive backup. Each analyst had access to a ‘T’ drive — what we
called ‘T’ drive shared across the SIPRnet. It allowed others to access
information that was stored on it. S6 operated the ‘T’ drive.
[(4)]
Compact disk rewritable or CD-RW back up. For larger datasets I saved
the information onto a re-writable disk, labeled the disks and stored
them in the conference room of the T-SCIF. This redundancy permitted us
to not worry about information loss. If the system crashed, I could
easily pull the information from a secondary computer, the ‘T’ drive or
one of the CD-RWs.
If another analysts wanted to access my data,
but I was unavailable, she could find my published products directory on
the ‘T’ drive or on the CD-RWs. I sorted all of my products or research
by date, time and group, and I updated the information on each of the
storage methods to ensure that the latest information was available to
them.
During the deployment I had several of the D6-A machines
crash on me. Whenever one of the computer crashed, I usually lost
information but the redundancy method ensured my ability to quickly
restore old backup data and add my current information to the machine
when it was repaired or replaced.
I stored the backup CD-RW with
larger datasets in the conference room of the T-SCIF or next to my
workstation. I marked the CD-RWs based on the classification level and
its content. Unclassified CD-RWs were only labeled with the content type
and not marked with classification markings. Early on in the
deployment, I only saved and stored the SigActs that were within or near
operational environment.
Later I thought it would be easier to
just to save all of the SigActs onto a CD-RW. The process would not take
very long to complete and so I downloaded the SigActs from CIDNE-I onto
a CD-RW. After finishing with CIDNE-I, I did the same with CIDNE-A. By
retrieving the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigActs, I was able to retrieve the
information whenever I needed it, and not rely upon the unreliable and
slow SIPRnet connectivity needed to pull. Instead, I could just find the
CD-RW and open up a pre-loaded spreadsheet.
This process began in
late December 2009 and continued through early January 2010. I could
quickly export one month of the SigAct data at a time and download in
the background as I did other tasks.
The process took
approximately a week for each table. After downloading the SigAct
tables, I periodically updated them by pulling the most recent SigActs
and simply copying them and pasting them into the database saved on the
CD-RW. I never hid the fact that I had downloaded copies of both the
SigAct tables from CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A. They were stored on
appropriately labeled and marked CD-RW, stored in the open.
I
viewed this the saving copies of CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A as for both for my
use and the use of anyone within the S2 section during the SIPRnet
connectivity issues.
In addition to the SigAct tables, I had a
large repository of HUMINT reports and Counter IED reports downloaded
from CIDNE-I. These contained reports that were relevant to the area in
and around our operational environment in Eastern Baghdad and the Diyala
Province of Iraq.
In order to compress the data to fit onto a
CD-RW, I used a compression algorithm called ‘bzip2′. The program used
to compress the data is called ‘WinRAR’. WinRAR is an application that
is free, and can be easily downloaded from the internet via the
Non-Secure Internet Relay Protocol Network or NIPRnet. I downloaded
WinRAR on NIPRnet and transfered it to the D6-A machine user profile
desktop using a CD-RW. I did not try to hide the fact that I was
downloading WinRAR onto my SIPRnet D6-A machine or computer.
With
the assistance of the bzip2 algorithm using the WinRAR program, I was
able to fit All of the SigActs onto a single CD-RW and relevant HUMINT
and Counter ID reports onto a separate CD-RW.
Facts regarding my knowledge of the WikiLeaks Organization, or WLO.
I
first became vaguely aware of the WLO during my AIT at Fort Huachuca,
Ariz., although I did not fully pay attention until the WLO released
purported Short Messaging System, or SMS, messages from 11 September
2001 on 25 November 2009. At that time references to the release and the
WLO website showed up in my daily Google news open source search for
information related to U.S. foreign policy.
The stories were about
how WLO published about approximately 500,000 messages. I then reviewed
the messages myself and realized that the posted messages were very
likely real given the sheer volume and detail of the content.
After
this, I began conducting research on WLO. I conducted searched on both
NIPRnet and SIPRnet on WLO beginning in late November 2009 and early
December 2009. At this time I also began to routinely monitor the WLO
website. In response to one of my searches in 2009, I found the United
States Army Counter Intelligence Center, or USACIC, report on the
WikiLeaks organization. After reviewing the report, I believed that this
report was possibly the one that my AIT referenced in early 2008.
I
may or may not have saved the report on my D6-A workstation. I know I
reviewed the document on other occasions throughout early 2010, and
saved it on both my primary and secondary laptops. After reviewing the
report, I continued doing research on WLO. However, based upon my
open-source collection, I discovered information that contradicted the
2008 USACIC report including information that indicated that similar to
other press agencies, WLO seemed to be dedicated to exposing illegal
activities and corruption.
WLO received numerous award and
recognition for its reporting activities. Also, in reviewing the WLO
website, I found information regarding U.S. military SOPs for Camp Delta
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and information on the then outdated rules of
engagement for ROE in Iraq for cross-border pursuits of former members
of Saddam Hussein [missed word] government.
After seeing the
information available on the WLO website, I continued following it and
collecting open-source information from it. During this time period, I
followed several organizations and groups including wire press agencies
such as the Associated Press and Reuters and private intelligence
agencies including Strategic Forecasting or Stratfor. This practice was
something I was trained to do during AIT, and was something that good
analysts were expected to do.
During the searches of WLO, I found
several pieces of information that I found useful in my work product in
my work as an analyst, specifically I recall WLO publishing documents
related to weapons trafficking between two nations that affected my OP. I
integrated this information into one or more of my work products.
In
addition to visiting the WLO website, I began following WLO using
Instand Relay Chat or IRC Client called ‘XChat’ sometime in early
January 2010.
IRC is a protocol for real-time internet
communications by messaging and conferencing, colloquially referred to
as chat rooms or chats. The IRC chat rooms are designed for group
communication discussion forums. Each IRC chat room is called a channel —
similar to a television where you can tune in or follow a channel — so
long as it is open and does not require [missed word].
Once you
[missed word] a specific IRC conversation, other users in the
conversation can see that you have joined the room. On the Internet
there are millions of different IRC channels across several services.
Channel topics span a range of topics covering all kinds of interests
and hobbies. The primary reason for following WLO on IRC was curiosity —
particularly in regards to how and why they obtained the SMS messages
referenced above. I believed that collecting information on the WLO
would assist me in this goal.
Initially I simply observed the IRC
conversations. I wanted to know how the organization was structured, and
how they obtained their data. The conversations I viewed were usually
technical in nature but sometimes switched to a lively debate on issue
the particular individual may have felt strongly about.
Over a
period of time I became more involved in these discussions, especially
when conversations turned to geopolitical events and information
technology topics, such as networking and encryption methods. Based on
these observations, I would describe the WL organization as almost
academic in nature. In addition to the WLO conversations, I participated
in numerous other IRC channels acros at least three different networks.
The other IRC channels I participated in normally dealt with technical
topics including with Linux and Berkley Secure Distribution (BSD)
operating systems, or OSs, networking, encryption algorithms and
techniques and other more political topics, such as politics and [missed
word].
I normally engaged in multiple IRC conversations
simultaneously — mostly publicly, but often privately. The XChat client
enabled me to manage these multiple conversations across different
channels and servers. The screen for XChat was often busy, but its
screens enabled me to see when something was interesting. I would then
select the conversation and either observe or participate.
I
really enjoyed the IRC conversations pertaining to and involving the
WLO, however, at some point in late February or early March of 2010, the
WLO IRC channel was no longer accessible. Instead, regular participants
of this channel switched to using the Jabber server. Jabber is another
internet communication [missed word] similar but more sophisticated than
IRC.
The IRC and Jabber conversations allowed me to feel
connected to others even when alone. They helped pass the time and keep
motivated throughout the deployment.
Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the SigActs.
As
indicated above, I created copies of the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigAct
tables as part of the process of backing up information. At the time I
did so, I did not intend to use this information for any purpose other
than for back up. However, I later decided to release this information
publicly. At that time, I believe and still believe that these tables
are two of the most significant documents of our time.
On 8
January 2010, I collected the CD-RW I stored in the conference room of
the T-SCIF and placed it into the cargo pocket of my ACU or Army Combat
Uniform. At the end of my shift, I took the CD-RW out of the T-SCIF and
brought it to my Containerized Housing Unit, or CHU. I copied the data
onto my personal laptop. Later at the beginning of my shift, I returned
the CD-RW back to the conference room of the T-SCIF. At the time I saved
the SigActs to my laptop, I planned to take them with me on mid-tour
leave and decide what to do with them.
At some point prior to my
mid-tour, I transfered the information from my computer to a Secure
Digital memory card from my digital camera. The SD card for the camera
also worked on my computer and allowed me to store the SigAct tables in a
secure manner for transport.
I began mid-tour leave on 23 January
2010, flying from Atlanta, Ga., to Reagan National Airport in Virginia.
I arrived at the home of my aunt, Debra M. Van Alstyne, in Potomac,
Md., and quickly got into contact with my then boyfriend, Tyler R.
Watkins. Tyler, then a student at Brandeis University in Waltham, Mass.,
and I made plans for me to visit him him Boston, Mass. [missed word].
I
was excited to see Tyler and planned on talking to Tyler about where
our relationship was going and about my time in Iraq. However, when I
arrived in the Boston area, Tyler and I seemed to become distant. He did
not seem very excited about my return from Iraq. I tried talking to him
about our relationship, but he refused to make any plans.
I also
tried to raising the topic of releasing the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigAct
tables to the public. I asked Tyler hypothetical questions about what he
would do if he had documents that he thought the public needed access
to. Tyler really didn’t have a specific answer for me. He tried to
answer the questions and be supportive, but seemed confused by the
question in this context.
I then tried to be more specific, but he
asked too many questions. Rather than try to explain my dilemma, I
decided to just drop the conversation. After a few days in Waltham, I
began to feel really bad. I was over-staying my welcome, and I returned
to Maryland. I spent the remainder of my time on leave in the
Washington, DC, area.
During this time a blizzard bombarded the
Mid-Atlantic, and I spent a significant period of time essentially stuck
in my aunt’s house in Maryland. I began to think about what I knew and
the information I still had in my possession. For me, the SigActs
represented the on-the-ground reality of both the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
I felt that we were risking so much for people that
seemed unwilling to cooperate with us, leading to frustration and anger
on both sides. I began to become depressed with the situation that we
found ourselves increasingly mired in year after year. The SigActs
documented this in great detail and provide a context of what we were
seeing on the ground.
In attempting to conduct counter-terrorism,
or CT, and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, we became obsessed with
capturing and killing human targets on lists and not being suspicious
of and avoiding cooperation with our Host Nation partners, and ignoring
the second- and third-order effects of accomplishing short-term goals
and missions. I believe that if the general public, especially the
American public, had access to the information contained within the
CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A tables, this could spark a domestic debate on the
role of the military and our foreign policy in general as [missed word]
as it related to Iraq and Afghanistan.
I also believed the
detailed analysis of the data over a long period of time by different
sectors of society might cause society to reevaluate the need or even
the desire to even to engage in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
operations that ignore the complex dynamics of the people living in the
effected environment every day.
At my aunt’s house, I debated what
I should do with the SigActs — in particular whether I should hold on
to them — or expose them through a press agency. At this point, I
decided that it made sense to try to expose the SigAct tables to an
American newspaper. I first called my local news paper, the Washington
Post, and spoke with a woman saying that she was a reporter. I asked her
if the Washington Post would be interested in receiving information
that would have enormous value to the American public.
Although we
spoke for about five minutes concerning the general nature of what I
possessed, I do not believe she took me seriously. She informed me that
the Washington Post would possibly be interested, but that such
decisions were made only after seeing the information I was referring to
and after consideration by senior editors.
I then decided to
contact [missed word] the most popular newspaper, the New York Times. I
called the public editor number on the New York Times website. The phone
rang and was answered by a machine. I went through the menu to the
section for news tips. I was routed to an answering machine. I left a
message stating I had access to information about Iraq and Afghanistan
that I believed was very important. However, despite leaving my Skype
phone number and personal email address, I never received a reply from
the New York Times.
I also briefly considered dropping into the
office for the Political Commentary blog, Politico, however the weather
conditions during my leave hampered my efforts to travel. After these
failed efforts, I had ultimately decided to submit the materials to the
WLO. I was not sure if the WLO would actually publish these SigAct
tables [missed a few words]. I was concerned that they might not be
noticed by the American media. However, based upon what I read about the
WLO through my research described above, this seemed to be the best
medium for publishing this information to the world within my reach.
At
my aunts house, I joined in on an IRC conversation and stated I had
information that needed to be shared with the world. I wrote that the
information would help document the true cost of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. One of the individuals in the IRC asked me to describe the
information. However, before I could describe the information another
individual pointed me to the link for the WLO website online submission
system. After ending my IRC connection, I considered my options one more
time. Ultimately, I felt that the right thing to do was to release the
SigActs.
On 3 February 2010, I visited the WLO website on my
computer and clicked on the submit documents link. Next I found the
submit your information online link and elected to submit the SigActs
via the onion router or TOR anonymizing network by special link. TOR is a
system intended to provide anonymity online. The software routes
Internet traffic through a network of servers and other TOR clients in
order to conceal the user’s location and identity.
I was familiar
with TOR and had it previously installed on a computer to anonymously
monitor the social media website of militia groups operating within
central Iraq. I followed the prompts and attached the compressed data
files of CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigActs. I attached a text file I drafted
while preparing to provide the documents to the Washington Post. It
provided rough guidelines, saying “It’s already been sanitized of any
source-identifying information. You might need to sit on this
information — perhaps 90 to 100 days — to figure out how best to release
such a large amount of data and to protect its source. This is possibly
one of the more significant documents of our time removing the fog of
war and revealing the true nature of 21st century asymmetric warfare.
Have a good day.”
After sending this, I left the SD card in a
camera case at my aunt’s house in the event I needed it again in the
future. I returned from mid-tour leave on 11 February 2010. Although the
information had not yet been publicly [released] by the WLO, I felt
this sense of relief by them having it. I felt I had accomplished
something that allowed me to have a clear conscience based upon what I
had seen and read about and knew were happening in both Iraq and
Afghanistan every day.
Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of 10 Reykjavik 13.
I
first became aware of the diplomatic cables during my training period
in AIT. I later learned about the Department of State or DoS Net-centric
Diplomacy NCD portal from the 2/10 Brigade Combat Team S2, Captain
Steven Lim. Captain Lim sent a section wide email to the other analysts
and officer in late December 2009 containing the SIPRnet link to the
portal along with the instructions to look at the cables contained
within them and to incorporate them into our work product.
Shortly
after this I also noticed the diplomatic cables were being reported to
in products from the corp level U.S. Forces Iraq, or US-I. Based upon
Captain Lim’s direction to become familiar with its contents, I read virtually every published cable concerning Iraq.
I
also began scanning the database and reading other random cables that
piqued my curiosity. It was around this time — in early to mid-January
of 2010, that I began searching the database for information on Iceland.
I became interested in Iceland due to the IRC conversations I viewed in
the WLO channel discussing an issue called Icesave. At this time I was
not very familiar with the topic, but it seemed to be a big issue for
those participating in the conversation. This is when I decided to
investigate and conduct a few searches on Iceland and find out more.
At
the time, I did not find anything discussing the Icesave issue either
directly or indirectly. I then conducted an open-source search for
Icesave. I then learned that Iceland was involved in a dispute with the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands concerning the financial collapse of
one or more of Iceland’s banks. According to open-source reporting, much
of the public controversy involved the United Kingdom’s use of
anti-terrorism legislation against Iceland in order to freeze Icelandic
access for payment of the guarantees for UK depositors that lost money.
Shortly
after returning from mid-tour leave, I returned to the Net Centric
Diplomacy portal to search for information on Iceland and Icesave, as
the topic had not abated on the WLO IRC channel. To my surprise, on 14
February 2010, I found the cable 10 Reykjavik 13, which referenced the
Icesave issue directly.
The cable published on 13 January 2010 was
just over two pages in length. I read the cable and quickly concluded
that Iceland was essentially being bullied diplomatically by two larger
European powers. It appeared to me that Iceland was out of viable
options and was coming to the U.S. for assistance. Despite the quiet
request for assistance, it did not appear that we were going to do
anything.
From my perspective it appeared that we were not getting
involved due to the lack of long-term geopolitical benefit to do so.
After digesting the contents of 10 Reykjavik 13 I debated whether this
was something I should send to the WLO. At this point the WLO had not
published or acknowledged receipt of the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A tables.
Despite not knowing that the SigActs were a priority for the WLO, I
decided the cable was something that would be important. I felt that I
would be able to right a wrong by having them publish this document. I
burned the information onto a CD-RW on 15 February 2010, took it to my
CHU, and saved it onto my personal laptop.
I navigated to the WLO
website via a TOR connection like before and uploaded the document via
the secure form. Amazingly, when WLO published 10 Reykjavik 13 within
hours, proving that the form worked and that they must have received the
SigAct tables.
Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons team, or AW team, video.
During
the mid-February 2010 time frame, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th
Mountain Division targeting analysts, then Specialist Jihrleah W.
Showman discussed a video that
Ms. Showman had found on the ‘T’ drive.
The
video depicted several individuals being engaged by an aerial weapons
team. At first I did not consider the video very special, as I have
viewed countless other war porn type videos depicting combat. However,
the recording of audio comments by the aerial weapons team crew and the
second engagement in the video of an unarmed bongo truck troubled me.
As
Showman and a few other analysts and officers in the T-SCIF commented
on the video and debated whether the crew violated the rules of
engagement, or ROE, in the second engagement. I shied away from this
debate, instead conducting some research on the event. I wanted to learn
what happened and whether there was any background to the events of the
day that the event occurred, 12 July 2007.
Using Google I
searched for the event by its date by its general location. I found
several new accounts involving two Reuters employees who were killed
during the aerial weapon team engagement. Another story explained that
Reuters had requested for a copy of the video under the Freedom of
Information Act, or FOIA. Reuters wanted to view the video in order to
understand what had happened and to improve their safety practices in
combat zones. A spokesperson for Reuters was quoted as saying that the
video might help avoid the reoccurrence of the tragedy and believed
there was a compelling need for the immediate release of the video.
Despite
the submission of the FOIA request, the news account explained that
CENTCOM replied to Reuters stating that they could not give a time frame
for considering a FOIA request and that the video might no longer
exist. Another story I found written a year later said that even though
Reuters was still pursuing their request. They still did not receive a
formal response or written determination in accordance with FOIA.
The
fact neither CENTCOM or Multi National Forces Iraq, or MNF-I, would not
voluntarily release the video troubled me further. It was clear to me
that the event happened because the aerial weapons team mistakenly
identified Reuters employees as a potential threat and that the people
in the bongo truck were merely attempting to assist the wounded. The
people in the van were not a threat but merely “good samaritans.” The
most alarming aspect of the video to me, however, was the seemly
delightful bloodlust they appeared to have.
The dehumanized the
individuals they were engaging and seemed to not value human life by
referring to them as quote “dead bastards” unquote and congratulating
each other on the ability to kill in large numbers. At one point in the
video there is an individual on the ground attempting to crawl to
safety. The individual is seriously wounded. Instead of calling for
medical attention to the location, one of the aerial weapons team crew
members verbally asks for the wounded person to pick up a weapon so that
he can have a reason to engage. For me, this seems similar to a child
torturing ants with a magnifying glass.
While saddened by the
aerial weapons team crew’s lack of concern about human life, I was
disturbed by the response of the discovery of injured children at the
scene. In the video, you can see that the bongo truck driving up to
assist the wounded individual. In response the aerial weapons team crew —
as soon as the individuals are a threat, they repeatedly request for
authorization to fire on the bongo truck and once granted they engage
the vehicle at least six times.
Shortly after the second
engagement, a mechanized infantry unit arrives at the scene. Within
minutes, the aerial weapons team crew learns that children were in the
van and despite the injuries the crew exhibits no remorse. Instead, they
downplay the significance of their actions, saying quote “Well, it’s
their fault for bringing their kids into a battle” unquote.
The
aerial weapons team crew members sound like they lack sympathy for the
children or the parents. Later in a particularly disturbing manner, the
aerial weapons team verbalizes enjoyment at the sight of one of the
ground vehicles driving over a body — or one of the bodies. As I
continued my research, I found an article discussing the book, ”The Good
Soldiers,” written by Washington Post writer David Finkel.
In Mr.
Finkel book, he writes about the aerial weapons team attack. As, I read
an online excerpt in Google Books, I followed Mr. Finkel’s account of
the event belonging to the video. I quickly realize that Mr. Finkel was
quoting, I feel in verbatim, the audio communications of the aerial
weapons team crew.
It is clear to me that Mr. Finkel obtained
access and a copy of the video during his tenure as an embedded
journalist. I was aghast at Mr. Finkel’s portrayal of the incident.
Reading his account, one would believe the engagement was somehow
justified as “payback” for an earlier attack that lead to the death of a
soldier. Mr. Finkel ends his account by discussing how a soldier finds
an individual still alive from the attack. He writes that the soldier
finds him and sees him gesture with his two forefingers together, a
common method in the Middle East to communicate that they are friendly.
However, instead of assisting him, the soldier makes an obscene gesture
extending his middle finger.
The individual apparently dies
shortly thereafter. Reading this, I can only think of how this person
was simply trying to help others, and then he quickly finds he needs
help as well. To make matter worse, in the last moments of his life, he
continues to express his friendly gesture — only to find himself
receiving this well-known gesture of unfriendliness. For me it’s all a
big mess, and I am left wondering what these things mean, and how it all
fits together. It burdens me emotionally.
I saved a copy of the
video on my workstation. I searched for and found the rules of
engagement, the rules of engagement annexes and a flow chart from the
2007 time period — as well as an unclassified Rules of Engagement smart
card from 2006. On 15 February 2010 I burned these documents onto a
CD-RW, the same time I burned the 10 Reykjavik 13 cable onto a CD-RW. At
the time, I placed the video and rules for engagement information onto
my personal laptop in my CHU. I planned to keep this information there
until I redeployed in Summer 2010. I planned on providing this to the
Reuters office in London to assist them in preventing events such as
this in the future.
However, after the WLO published 10 Reykjavik
13, I altered my plans. I decided to provide the video and the rules of
engagement to them so that Reuters would have this information before I
redeployed from Iraq. On about 21 February 2010, I described above, I
used the WLO submission form and uploaded the documents. The WLO
released the video on 5 April 2010. After the release, I was concerned
about the impact of the video and how it would been received by the
general public.
I hoped that the public would be as alarmed as me
about the conduct of the aerial weapons team crew members. I wanted the
American public to know that not everyone in Iraq and Afghanistan are
targets that needed to be neutralized, but rather people who were
struggling to live in the pressure-cooker environment of what we call
asymmetric warfare. After the release I was encouraged by the response
in the media and general public, who observed the aerial weapons team
video. As I hoped, others were just as troubled — if not more troubled
that me by what they saw.
At this time, I began seeing reports
claiming that the Department of Defense and CENTCOM could not confirm
the authenticity of the video. Additionally, one of my supervisors,
Captain Casey Fulton,
stated her belief that the video was not authentic. In her response, I
decided to ensure that the authenticity of the video would not be
questioned in the future. On 25 February 2010, I emailed Captain Fulton,
a link to the video that was on our ‘T’ drive, and a copy of the video
published by WLO that was collected by the open-source center, so she
could compare them herself.
Around this time frame, I burned a
second CD-RW containing the aerial weapons team video. In order to made
it appear authentic, I placed a classification sticker and wrote Reuters
FOIA REQ on its face. I placed the CD-RW in one of my personal CD cases
containing a set of ‘Starting Out in Arabic CDs.’ I planned on mailing
out the CD-RW to Reuters after our redeployment, so they could have a
copy that was unquestionably authentic.
Almost immediately after
submitting the aerial weapons team video and rules of engagement
documents, I notified the individuals in the WLO IRC to expect an
important submission. I received a response from an individual going by
the handle of “ox” — at first our conversations were general in nature,
but over time as our conversations progressed, I assessed this
individual to be an important part of the WLO.
Due to the strict
adherence of anonymity by the WLO, we never exchanged identifying
information. However, I believe the individual was likely Mr. Julian
Assange [he pronounced it with three syllables], Mr. Daniel Schmidt, or a
proxy representative of Mr. Assange and Schmidt.
As the
communications transfered from IRC to the Jabber client, I gave “ox” and
later “pressassociation” the name of Nathaniel Frank in my address
book, after the author of a book I read in 2009.
After a period of
time, I developed what I felt was a friendly relationship with
Nathaniel. Our mutual interest in information technology and politics
made our conversations enjoyable. We engaged in conversation often.
Sometimes as long as an hour or more. I often looked forward to my
conversations with Nathaniel after work.
The anonymity that was
provided by TOR and the Jabber client and the WLO’s policy allowed me to
feel I could just be myself, free of the concerns of social labeling
and perceptions that are often placed upon me in real life. In real
life, I lacked a close friendship with the people I worked with in my
section, the S2 section.
In my section, the S2 section supported
battalions and the 2nd Brigade Combat Team as a whole. For instance, I
lacked close ties with my roommate to his discomfort regarding my
perceived sexual orientation. Over the next few months, I stayed in
frequent contact with Nathaniel. We conversed on nearly a daily basis
and I felt that we were developing a friendship.
Conversations
covered many topics and I enjoyed the ability to talk about pretty much
everything, and not just the publications that the WLO was working on.
In retrospect that these dynamics were artificial and were valued more
by myself than Nathaniel. For me these conversations represented an
opportunity to escape from the immense pressures and anxiety that I
experienced and built up through out the deployment. It seems that as I
tried harder to fit in at work, the more I seemed to alienate my peers
and lose the respect, trust and support I needed.
Facts regarding
the unauthorized storage and disclosure of documents related to the
detainments by the Iraqi Federal Police or FP, and the Detainee
Assessment Briefs, and the USACIC United States Army Counter
Intelligence Center report.
On 27 February 2010, a report was
received from a subordinate battalion. The report described an event in
which the Federal Police, or FP, detained 15 individuals for printing
anti-Iraqi literature. On 2 March 2010, I received instructions from an
S3 section officer in the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain
Division Tactical Operation Center or TOC to investigate the matter, and
figure out who the quote “bad guys” unquote were and how significant
this event was for the Federal Police.
Over the course of my
research I found that none of the individuals had previous ties to
anti-Iraqi actions or suspected terrorist militia groups. A few hours
later, I received several [playlist?] from the scene — from this
subordinate battalion. They were accidentally sent to an officer on a
different team on the S2 section and she forwarded them to me.
These
photos included picture of the individuals, pallets of unprinted paper
and seized copies of the final printed material or the printed document;
and a high resolution photo of the printed material itself. I printed
up one [missed word] copy of a high resolution photo — I laminated it
for ease of use and transfer. I then walked to the TOC and delivered the
laminated copy to our category two interpreter.
She reviewed the
information and about a half and hour later delivered a rough written
transcript in English to the S2 section. I read the transcript and
followed up with her, asking her for her take on the content. She said
it was easy for her to transcribe verbatim, since I blew up the
photograph and laminated it. She said the general nature of the document
was benign. The document, as I had sensed as well, was merely a
scholarly critique of the then current Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki.
It detailed corruption within the cabinet of
al-Maliki’s government and the financial impact of his corruption on the
Iraqi people. After discovering this discrepancy between the Federal
Police’s report and the interpreter’s transcript, I forwarded this
discovery to the top OIC and the battle NCOIC. The top OIC and the
overhearing battle captain informed me that they didn’t need or want to
know this information anymore. They told me to quote “drop it” unquote
and to just assist them and the Federal Police in finding out where more
of these print shops creating quote “anti-Iraqi literature” unquote
were.
I couldn’t believe what I heard, and I returned to the
T-SCIF and complained to the other analysts and my section NCOIC about
what happened. Some were sympathetic, but no one wanted to do anything
about it.
I am the type of person who likes to know how things
work. And, as an analyst, this means I always want to figure out the
truth. Unlike other analysts in my section or other sections within the
2nd Brigade Combat Team, I was not satisfied with just scratching the
surface and producing canned or cookie-cutter assessments. I wanted to
know why something was the way it was, and what we could to correct or
mitigate a situation.
I knew that if I continued to assist the
Baghdad Federal Police in identifying the political opponents of Prime
Minister al-Maliki, those people would be arrested and in the custody of
the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police and very likely tortured
and not seen again for a very long time — if ever.
Instead of
assisting the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police, I decided to
take the information and expose it to the WLO, in the hope that before
the upcoming 7 March 2010 election, they could generate some immediate
press on the issue and prevent this unit of the Federal Police from
continuing to crack down in political opponents of al-Maliki.
On 4
March 2010, I burned the report, the photos, the high resolution copy
of the pamphlet and the interpreter’s hand-written transcript onto a
CD-RW. I took the CD-RW to my CHU and copied the data onto my personal
computer. Unlike the times before, instead of uploading the information
through the WLO website submission form, I made a Secure File Transfer
Protocol, or SFTP, connection to a file drop box operated by the WLO.
The
drop box contained a folder that allowed me to upload directly into it.
Saving files into this directory allowed anyone with log in access to
the server to view and download them. After uploading these files to the
WLO, on 5 March 2010, I notified Nathaniel over Jabber. Although
sympathetic, he said that the WLO needed more information to confirm the
event in order for it to be published or to gain interest in the
international media.
I attempted to provide the specifics, but to
my disappointment, the WLO website chose not to publish this
information. At the same time, I began sifting through information from
the U.S. Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM, and Joint Task Force Guantanamo,
Cuba, or JTF-GTMO. The thought occurred to me — although unlikely —
that I wouldn’t be surprised if the individuals detainees by the Federal
Police might be turned over back into U.S. custody, ending up in the
custody of Joint Task Force Guantanamo.
As I digested through the
information on Joint Task Force Guantanamo, I quickly found the Detainee
Assessment Briefs, or DABs. I previously came across the document’s
before in 2009 but did not think much about them. However, this time I
was more curious in this search and I found them again.
The DABs
were written in standard DoD memorandum format and addressed the
commander US SOUTHCOM. Each memorandum gave basic and background
information about a detainee held at some point by Joint Task Force
Guantanamo. I have always been interested on the issue of the moral
efficacy of our actions surrounding Joint Task Force Guantanamo. On the
one hand, I have always understood the need to detain and interrogate
individuals who might wish to harm the United States and our allies,
however, I felt that what we were trying to do at Joint Task Force
Guantanamo.
However, the more I became educated on the topic, it
seemed that we found ourselves holding an increasing number of
individuals indefinitely that we believed or knew to be innocent,
low-level foot soldiers that did not have useful intelligence and would
be released if they were still held in theater.
I also recall that
in early 2009 the, then newly elected president, Barack Obama, stated
that he would close Joint Task Force Guantanamo, and that the facility
compromised our standing overall and diminished our quote “moral
authority” unquote.
After familiarizing myself with the Detainee
Assessment Briefs, I agree. Reading through the Detainee Assessment
Briefs, I noticed that they were not analytical products, instead they
contained summaries of tear line versions of interim intelligence
reports that were old or unclassified. None of the DABs contained the
names of sources or quotes from tactical interrogation reports or TIR’s.
Since the DABs were being sent to the US SOUTHCOM commander, I assessed
that they were intended to provide very general background information
on each of the detainees and not a detailed assessment.
In
addition to the manner in which the DAB’s were written, I recognized
that they were at least several years old and discussed detainees that
were already released from Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Based on this, I
determined that the DABs were not very important from either an
intelligence or a national security standpoint. On 7 March 2010, during
my Jabber conversation with Nathaniel, I asked him if he thought the
DABs were of any use to anyone.
Nathaniel indicated that although
he did not believe that they were of political significance, he did
believe that they could be used to merge into the general historical
account of what occurred at Joint Task Force Guantanamo. He also thought
that the DABs might be helpful to the legal counsel of those currently
and previously held at JTF-GTMO.
After this discussion, I decided
to download the data. I used an application called Wget to download the
DABs. I downloaded Wget off of the NIPRnet laptop in the T-SCIF, like
other programs. I saved that onto a CD-RW, and placed the executable in
my “My Documents” directory on my user profile on the D6-A SIPRnet
workstation.
On 7 March 2010, I took the list of links for the
detainee assessment briefs, and Wget downloaded them sequentially. I
burned the data onto a CD-RW, took it into my CHU, and copied them onto
my personal computer. On 8 March 2010, I combined the Detainee
Assessment Briefs with the United States Army Counterintelligence Center
reports on the WLO, into a compressed IP file. Zip files contain
multiple files which are compressed to reduce their size.
After
creating the zip file, I uploaded the file onto their cloud drop box via
Secure File Transfer Protocol. Once these were uploaded, I notified
Nathaniel that the information was in the “x” directory, which had been
designated for my own use. Earlier that day, I downloaded the USACIC
report on WLO.
As discussed about, I previously reviewed the
report on numerous occasions and although I saved the document onto the
work station before, I could not locate it. After I found the document
again, I downloaded it to my work station, and saved it onto the same
CD-RW as the Detainee Assessment Briefs described above.
Although
my access included a great deal of information, I decided I had nothing
else to send to WLO after sending the Detainee Assessment Briefs and the
USACIC report. Up to this point I had sent them the following: the
CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigActs tables; the Reykjavik 13 Department of State
Cable; the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons team video and the 2006-2007
rules of engagement documents; the SigAct report and supporting
documents concerning the 15 individuals detained by the Baghdad Federal
Police; the USSOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force Guantanamo Detainee
Assessment Briefs; a USACIC report on the WikiLeaks website and the
WikiLeaks organization.
Over the next few weeks I did not send any
additional information to the WLO. I continued to converse with
Nathaniel over the Jabber client and in the WLO IRC channel. Although I
stopped sending documents to WLO, no one associated with the WLO
pressured me into giving more information. The decisions that I made to
send documents and information to the WLO and the website were my own
decisions, and I take full responsibility for my actions.
Facts regarding the unauthorized disclosure of Other Government Documents.
One
22 March 2010, I downloaded two documents. I found these documents over
the course of my normal duties as an analyst. Based on my training and
the guidance of my superiors, I look at as much information as possible.
Doings
so provided me with the ability to make connections that others might
miss. On several occasions during the month of March, I accessed
information from a Government entity. I read several documents from a
section within this Government entity. The content of two of these
documents upset me greatly. I had difficulty believing what this section
was doing.
On 22 March 2010, I downloaded the two documents that I
found troubling. I compressed them into a zip file named blah.zip and
burned them onto a CD-RW. I took the CD-RW to my CHU and saved the file
to my personal computer.
I uploaded the information to the WLO website using the designated prompts.
Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the Net Centric Diplomacy Department of State Cables.
In
late March of 2010, I received a warning over Jabber from Nathaniel
that the WLO website would be publishing the aerial weapons team video.
He indicated that the WLO would be very busy and the frequency and
intensity of our Jabber conversations [would] decrease significantly.
During this time, I had nothing but work to distract me.
I read
more of the diplomatic cables published on the Department of State Net
Centric Diplomacy. With my insatiable curiosity and interest in
geopolitics, I became fascinated with them. I read not only the cables
on Iraq, but also about countries and events that I found interesting.
The
more I read, the more I was fascinated with the way that we dealt with
other nations and organizations. I also began to think the documented
backdoor deals and seemingly criminal activity that didn’t seem
characteristic of the de facto leader of the free world.
Up to
this point, during the deployment, I had issues I struggled with and
difficulty at work. Of the documents release, the cables were the only
one I was not absolutely certain couldn’t harm the United States. I
conducted research on the cables published on the Net Centric Diplomacy
as well as how Department of State cables worked, in general.
In
particular, I wanted to know how each cable was published on SIRPnet via
the Net Centric Diplomacy. As part of my open source research, I found a
document published by the Department of State on its official website.
The
document provided guidance on caption markings for individual cables
and handling instructions for their distribution. I quickly learned the
caption markings clearly detailed the sensitivity of the Department of
State cables. For example, NODIS or No Distribution was used for
messages at the highest sensitivity and were only distributed to the
authorized recipients.
The SIPDIS or SIPRnet distribution caption
was applied only to recording of other information messages that were
deemed appropriate for a release for a wide number of individuals.
According to the Department of State guidance for a cable to have the
SIPDIS [missed word] caption, it could not include other captions that
were intended to limit distribution.
The SIPDIS caption was only
for information that could only be shared with anyone with access to
SIPRnet. I was aware that thousands of military personel, DoD,
Department of State and other civilian agencies had easy access to the
tables. The fact that the SIPDIS caption was only for wide distribution
made sense to me, given that the vast majority of the Net Centric
Diplomacy Cables were not classified.
The more I read the cables,
the more I came to the conclusion that this was the type of information
that should become public. I once read a and used a quote on open
diplomacy written after the First World War and how the world would be a
better place if states would avoid making secret pacts and deals with
and against each other.
I thought these cables were a prime
example of a need for a more open diplomacy. Given all of the Department
of State cables that I read, the fact that most of the cables were
unclassified, and that all the cables have a SIPDIS caption.
I
believe that the public release of these cables would not damage the
United States; however, I did believe that the cables might be
embarrassing, since they represented very honest opinions and statements
behind the backs of other nations and organizations.
In many ways
these cables are a catalogue of cliques and gossip. I believed exposing
this information might make some within the Department of State and
other government entities unhappy. On 22 March 2010, I began downloading
a copy of the SIPDIS cables using the program Wget, described above.
I
used instances of the Wget application to download the Net Centric
Diplomacy cables in the background. As I worked on my daily tasks, the
Net centric Diplomacy cables were downloaded from 28 March 2010 to 9
April 2010. After downloading the cables, I saved them on to a CD-RW.
These
cables went from the earliest dates in Net Centric Diplomacy to 28
February 2010. I took the CD-RW to my CHU on 10 April 2010. I sorted the
cables on my personal computer, compressed them using the bzip2
compression algorithm described above, and uploaded them to the WLO via
designated drop box described above.
On 3 May 2010, I used Wget to
download and update of the cables for the months of March 2010 and
April 2010 and saved the information onto a zip file and burned it to a
CD-RW. I then took the CD-RW to my CHU and saved those to my computer. I
later found that the file was corrupted during the transfer. Although I
intended to resave another copy of these cables, I was removed from the
T-SCIF on 8 May 2010 after an altercation.
Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of Garani, Farah Province Afghanistan 15-6 Investigation and Videos.
[
NB
Pfc. Manning plead 'not guilty' to the Specification 11, Charge II for
the Garani Video as charged by the government, which alleged as November
charge date. Read more here.]
In
late March 2010, I discovered a US CENTCOM directly on a 2009 airstrike
in Afghanistan. I was searching CENTCOM I could use as an analyst. As
described above, this was something that myself and other officers did
on a frequent basis. As I reviewed the incident and what happened. The
airstrike occurred in the Garani village in the Farah Province,
Northwestern Afghanistan. It received worldwide press coverage during
the time as it was reported that up to 100 to 150 Afghan civilians —
mostly women and children — were accidentally killed during the
airstrike.
After going through the report and the [missed word]
annexes, I began to review the incident as being similar to the 12 July
2007 aerial weapons team engagements in Iraq. However, this event was
noticeably different in that it involved a significantly higher number
of individuals, larger aircraft and much heavier munitions. Also, the
conclusions of the report are more disturbing than those of the July
2007 incident.
I did not see anything in the 15-6 report or its
annexes that gave away sensitive information. Rather, the investigation
and its conclusions were — what those involved should have done, and how
to avoid an event like this from occurring again.
After
investigating the report and its annexes, I downloaded the 15-6
investigation, PowerPoint presentations, and several other supporting
documents to my D6-A workstation. I also downloaded three zip files
containing the videos of the incident. I burned this information onto a
CD-RW and transfered it to the personal computer in my CHU. I did later
that day or the next day — I uploaded the information to the WL website
this time using a new version of the WLO website submission form.
Unlike
other times using the submission form above, I did not activate the TOR
anonymizer. Your Honor, this concludes my statement and facts for this
providence inquiry.
